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Abstract
& Deductive reasoning is fundamental to science, human
culture, and the solution of problems in daily life. It starts with
premises and yields a logically necessary conclusion that is not
explicit in the premises. Here we investigated the neurocogni-
tive processes underlying logical thinking with event-related
functional magnetic resonance imaging. We specifically focused
on three temporally separable phases: (1) the premise process-
ing phase, (2) the premise integration phase, and (3) the vali-
dation phase in which reasoners decide whether a conclusion
logically follows from the premises. We found distinct patterns
of cortical activity during these phases, with initial temporo-
occipital activation shifting to the prefrontal cortex and then to
the parietal cortex during the reasoning process. Activity in
these latter regions was specific to reasoning, as it was signifi-
cantly decreased during matched working memory problems
with identical premises and equal working memory load. &
INTRODUCTION
How do humans think deductively? Why do we commit
mistakes in reasoning? And which patterns of brain
activity might underlie deductive reasoning? Cognitive
science has focused on the first two questions and
provided some tentative answers. It is believed that we
think deductively by applying different mental algo-
rithms, partially by constructing models in the usual
logical sense and partially by applying mental rules,
which are similar to rules in computer programs. It is
also believed that humans have the competence to per-
form error-free deductive inferences. Errors do occur,
however, because reasoning performance is limited by
the capacities of the cognitive system, misunderstand-
ing of the premises, ambiguity of problems, and moti-
vational factors (Manktelow, 1999; Evans, Newstead, &
Byrne, 1993; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991).
But how do our brains enable us to solve deductive
reasoning problems? This question is much less well
understood. Recent functional brain imaging studies
have provided some of the first insights into the brain
circuits underlying deductive reasoning. Reasoning with
abstract premises seems to involve the right hemi-
sphere, whereas reasoning with concrete material relies
on processing in the left hemisphere (Goel & Dolan,
2001; Goel, Buchel, Frith, & Dolan, 2000). During reason-
ing, portions of the parieto-occipital cortices are active,
pointing to the role of visuospatial processes (Knauff,
Ruff, & Johnson-Laird, 2003; Ruff, Knauff, Fangmeier,
& Spreer, 2003; Knauff, Mulack, Kassubek, Salih, &
Greenlee, 2002). The more visual features are described
in the reasoning problem, the more activity in occipital
cortical areas can be found (Knauff, Fangmeier, et al.,
2003). Moreover, reasoning-related activity in parietal
areas correlates with visuospatial ability (Ruff, Knauff,
Fangmeier, & Spreer, 2003).
However, most of these studies have one pitfall in
common. They presented the problems as sentences, ei-
ther on the screen or via headphones. Hence, reasoning-
related brain activity may have been confounded by
higher-level linguistic processing. In addition, many of
these studies examined the brain activation during the
whole reasoning process in a blocked fashion, and thus,
could not distinguish reasoning-related processes during
different stages of problem processing. A few studies
so far compared the neuronal processes during the
important conclusion sentence of the reasoning problem
with the presentation of irrelevant control sentences
(e.g., Goel & Dolan, 2001). However, these control sen-
tences clearly did not need to be processed as elaborately
as the reasoning problem, and did not provide any
information about brain processes during premise pro-
cessing. Thus, it is unclear whether reasoning is associ-
ated with distinct subprocesses not related to sentence
processing, and how these processes may be differen-
tially involved in different stages of reasoning.
The aim of the present study was to disentangle the
neurocognitive subprocesses underlying the different
phases in the reasoning process, and at the same time
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to overcome the potential linguistic confound in the
previous studies on the neuronal basis of deductive
reasoning. We employed event-related functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) with 12 participants,
who solved 32 linear syllogisms with a spatial content
(while in the scanner). We decided to use problems with
a spatial content, because spatial relations are easily
understood by logically untrained participants. Because
we aimed at distinguishing the pure reasoning process
from the maintenance of information in working mem-
ory, in a second condition participants had to simply
keep the premises of the identical problems in working
memory (maintenance problems) without making infer-
ences (explanation below). It is important to note that
the premises and the conclusion of the inference prob-
lems were each presented as single display frames, by
replacing the sentential premises with graphic arrange-
ments describing the spatial relations between three
letters. With this procedure, no further linguistic pro-
cessing was necessary to extract the spatial relations
between the objects. Moreover, the processing of the
first premise, the second premise, and the conclusion
was time-locked to the brief presentation of the letter
arrangements (Figure 1). Thus, we could examine the
brain activity elicited by the different phases of the
reasoning process.
Based on behavioral findings concerning the cognitive
processes involved in reasoning (Rader & Sloutsky,
2002; Evans et al., 1993; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991),
we predicted that there should be distinct patterns of
neuronal activation associated with the three phases of
the reasoning process: During the presentation of both
the first and second premises, reasoners have to process
and keep in mind the two letters of each premise and
their spatial relation (premise processing phase). During
the second premise exclusively, the two premises are
integrated into one unified representation and a puta-
tive conclusion is drawn (premise integration phase).
Finally, reasoners compare the conclusion they drew
from the premises with the displayed conclusion, and
indicate by pressing a button whether the displayed
conclusion is ‘‘True’’ or ‘‘False.’’ We denote this as the
validation phase. It is critical to appreciate that the
processing of the matched maintenance problems also
proceeded in three phases, but that there was no need
for premise integration during the second stage. More-
over, in the third stage of the maintenance problems,
participants only had to remember the temporal se-
quence in the premises and to match it with the third
sentence presented. They did not draw inferences, but
the memory load was the same as in the reasoning
problems. Although the different presentations thus
cannot be called ‘‘premises’’ in the literal sense, we
henceforth use the terms to clarify the correspondence
to the reasoning problems. On any given trial, a letter
displayed prior to problem presentation identified the
following problem as a reasoning or a maintenance
problem. We hypothesized that the reasoning and the
maintenance problems should both entail the mainte-
nance of premises, but that only the reasoning problems
should demand for the integration of the premises and
the validation of a putative conclusion. To explore the
influence of individual differences in visuospatial skills
on brain activity during the reasoning and maintenance
problems, the participants were tested after the exper-
iment with the ‘‘Block Design Test’’ (BDT) of the
German Equivalent to the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale (HAWIE-R, Tewes, 1991).
RESULTS
Behavioral Data and Post-test
As expected, the behavioral data collected inside the
scanner showed that reasoning problems were signifi-
cantly more difficult than maintenance problems (Evans
Figure 1. Sequence of a reasoning problem. Prior to each problem, an ‘‘S’’ (‘‘Schließen’’ in German) or an ‘‘E’’ (‘‘Erinnern’’ in German) was
presented for 1 sec. The spatial relation between the two letters of each premise or conclusion was coded by placing it right or left from the
midpoint of the screen. Each trial began with presentation of the first letter for 1500 msec, followed by the second letter for 1500 msec, and a
pause for 1000 (first premise), making a total of 4 sec. The period for the second premise and the conclusion or maintenance was the same
as during the first premise.
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et al., 1993; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) in terms of
accuracy (91% < 97% correct answers; Z = 2.31, p =
.021) and latency (3021 msec > 2843 msec response
time; Z = 2.04, p = .041, Wilcoxon Test because of
non-normal distributions, see Siegel & Castellan, 1989).
The spatial-constructive intelligence scores (BDT) of
all participants (measured after scanning) were within
the normal to superior range (mean value equivalent to
an IQ of 116, standard deviation equivalent to 15 IQ-
points, lowest value equivalent to an IQ of 105).
fMRI Data
Whole-Brain Analysis
For the reasoning problems, the brain imaging data
showed clearly distinguishable brain activation patterns
during the different phases of the inference process
(Table 1 and Figure 2A–C). First, the premise process-
ing phase activated two large bilateral regions in the
occipito-temporal cortex (OTC; Figure 2A). Second,
during the premise integration phase (Figure 2B), these
two regions in the OTC and an additional region in the
anterior prefrontal cortex (APFC) were activated. The
cluster in the APFC covered parts of the middle frontal
(Brodmann’s area [BA] 10) and the anterior cingulate
(BA 32). Third, the validation phase activated three
regions: two in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and one in
the posterior parietal cortex (PPC; Figure 2C). More
precisely, the clusters in the PFC were located in the
middle frontal gyrus (BA 9, 8, and 6), in the right
hemisphere extending into the medial frontal and the
anterior cingulate (BA 32). The PPC activation covered
parts of the precuneus (BA 7), and of the superior and
inferior parietal lobule (BA 7, 40) in both hemispheres.
The contrasts for the maintenance problems were
calculated in a similar fashion as those for reasoning
(see Methods). During the premise processing phase, we
found similar OTC activations as those obtained during
reasoning (compare Figure 2A vs. Figure 2D and Table 2).
During presentation of the second premise (premise
maintenance phase), which now required only premise
maintenance but not integration, we again found activa-
tion in the OTC, APFC, and PPC; however, activity in the
APFC and the PPC was significantly lower than during
reasoning (see below, and compare Figure 2B vs. 2E,
Figure 2C vs. 2F, Figure 2G vs. 2H. Significant differences
between reasoning and maintenance problems are
shown in the bar charts in Figure 4 and in Table 3).
We also examined the overlap between the reasoning-
and maintenance-related activities in a conjunction anal-
ysis (displayed in Figure 3A–C). Congruent with the
visual inspection of the activity during the different
problems, activity common to both problems was found
in the OTC for the first and second phases (inferior and
middle occipital gyrus, middle temporal cortex (TC),
lingual gyrus, fusiform gyrus, BA 18, 19, 37), and in the
PPC (inferior and superior parietal lobule and precuneus
BA 40, 7) for the third phase.
When directly comparing the activations elicited by
reasoning and maintenance (Figure 4A–C and D–F), five
regions showed higher activation during reasoning than
during maintenance: the APFC (BA 10) and the basal
ganglia during the second phase (Figure 4B), and the
PFC (left/right: middle and medial frontal cortex, BA 8, 6,
32) and right PPC (precuneus, BA 7) during the third
phase (Figure 4C). Note that the conjunction analysis
pointed out that bilateral PPC activity is common for
both problems, however, only activity in the right pre-
cuneus (BA 7) was significantly higher during the third
phase of reasoning than during the corresponding stage
of maintenance. Conversely, only two regions in the left
TC (TC L, middle and superior temporal gyrus, BA 21,
22) during the premise processing phase (Figure 4D)
and one region in the medial occipital cortex (OC M,
cuneus, BA 18) during the maintenance validation phase
(Figure 4F) showed significantly higher activity during
maintenance than during reasoning. A region-of-interest
(ROI) analysis of the mean activity in the eight regions
found in the whole-brain analysis was made. The signals
from each cluster were directly compared with separate
2  3 factorial analyses of variance (ANOVAs, Problem 
Phase, repeated measurements) in which all interac-
tions were significant (significant differences tested with
a t test for paired samples between the problems in each
phase were marked with an asterisk in the bar charts in
Figure 4). Three additional significant differences were
found in the ROI analysis in the right APFC during the
maintenance validation phase and in the medial and
lateral TC during the reasoning validation phase (see
Figure 4 bar charts).
Reasoning Difficulty
During performing working memory problems, the par-
ticipants showed higher accuracy and faster response
times than during reasoning problems. One possible
explanation for the differences between reasoning and
maintenance problems thus could be these differences
in performance difficulty. To rule out this explana-
tion, we calculated an additional model for each partic-
ipant, in which we included a regressor which estimated,
across trials, the parametric modulation of neuronal
response by trial response time. The regressor partialed
out the effect of trial difficulty of every contrast between
reasoning and maintenance. Nevertheless, we found the
same significant differences between the conditions in
the APFC during the second phase, and for the left/right
PFC and the right PPC during the third phase.
Individual Differences in Brain Activity
To examine possible relations between individual spatial
ability and reasoning-related neocortical brain activity,
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we examined the correlation (in a different model in
SPM99) between the performance on the BDT and the
neural activation in each phase of the two problems
(Ruff et al., 2003). In this analysis, we found statistically
significant negative correlations of the participants’ BDT
score with neural activity during the reasoning premise
integration phase in the left and right PPC but not
during maintenance. These correlations, along with
other correlations, are summarized in Table 4.
DISCUSSION
The most fundamental result of our study is that different
cortical structures are activated during different phases
of logical thinking. Activation of occipito-temporal struc-
tures was found in the premise processing phase, activa-
tion in the APFC in the subsequent integration phase,
and activation of the PPC and PFC during the final
reasoning validation phase. Because problems were
presented as graphic depictions of the state of the affairs,
these activations cannot be explained by reading and lin-
guistic processing of the premises. Moreover, the main-
tenance condition employed in the present study was
identical to the reasoning problems in terms of problem
content, visual display, and working memory load. In
this condition, we found significant lower APFC, PFC, and
right PPC activations in the premise maintenance phase,
and in the maintenance validation phase, respectively.
Table 1. Localization of Activation during
the Reasoning Problems
Anatomical Region BA t Score
Talairach
Coordinates
x y z
Premise Processing Phase
Cluster left occipito-temporal (VOX = 493***)
Middle occipital
gyrus (L)
37 12.79 48 70 4
Inferior occipital
gyrus (L)
19 10.49 44 70 3
Middle occipital
gyrus (L)
19 9.64 32 85 15
Cluster right occipito-temporal (VOX = 428***)
Inferior occipital
gyrus (R)
18 11.25 44 74 0
Middle occipital
gyrus (R)
37 11.07 44 66 3
Superior temporal
gyrus (R)
39 9.54 48 54 10
Premise Integration Phase
Cluster anterior medial frontal (VOX = 110***)
Anterior cingulate (R) 32 5.67 20 39 2
Medial frontal
gyrus (R)
10 5.39 16 50 3
Anterior cingulate (L) 32 4.98 20 39 2
Cluster left occipito-temporal (VOX = 269***)
Fusiform gyrus (L) 37 9.43 32 59 7
Fusiform gyrus (L) 20 7.32 28 40 18
Parahippocampal
gyrus (L)
36 6.93 20 36 12
Cluster right occipito-temporal (VOX = 216***)
Fusiform gyrus (R) 19 6.70 32 66 7
Cerebellum,
Culmen (R)
— 5.94 32 55 21
Cuneus (R) 18 5.72 16 93 8
Reasoning Validation Phase
Cluster medial and right frontal (VOX = 140***)
Medial frontal
gyrus (L)
32 6.38 8 10 47
Middle frontal
gyrus (R)
6 6.22 28 1 52
Middle frontal
gyrus (R)
6 5.62 36 5 52
Table 1. (continued )
Anatomical Region BA t Score
Talairach
Coordinates
x y z
Cluster left frontal (VOX = 47**)
Middle frontal gyrus (L) 6 7.57 36 2 48
Middle frontal gyrus (L) 9 3.46 52 10 36
Precentral gyrus (L) 6 3.37 32 9 52
Cluster bilateral parietal (VOX = 388**)
Inferior parietal
lobule (L)
40 7.27 44 44 46
Inferior parietal
lobule (L)
40 6.75 32 45 43
Precuneus (R) 7 5.89 24 68 40
RFX Analysis: SPM(t)s were thresholded for height at t = 3.0, and
cluster level p  .05, corrected for multiple comparisons. Locations,
t scores, and Talairach coordinates refer to the peak voxels of the
cluster. The correspondence of this voxel to Brodmann’s areas is only
established when applicable; however, note that localization can only
be performed at the level of the whole cluster. VOX = number of
voxels; L = left; R = right.
**p  .01.
***p  .001.
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Another finding is that during reasoning, the increase of
activation in the PPC and right frontal cortex covaried
negatively with the participants’ visuospatial skills. In the
following, we will discuss these findings in the framework
of a neurocognitive three-stage model of human (rela-
tional) reasoning.
Premise Processing Phase
The initial phase, the processing of the two premises,
activated bilateral cortical structures in the OTC. These
areas have been found active during problems such as
visual working memory and imagery (Kosslyn, Ganis, &
Thompson, 2001; Postle, Stern, Rosen, & Corkin, 2000;
Toga & Mazziotta, 2000; Courtney, Ungerleider, Keil,
& Haxby, 1996; Kosslyn, et al., 1994), and correspond
to the ventral ‘‘what’’-stream (Ungerleider, Courtney, &
Haxby, 1998). The activity found in our study is consist-
ent with the notion that reasoners use their general
knowledge to represent in ‘‘small scale’’ what the prem-
ises describe. Such models are often described as a
type of diagram because their structure is analogous to
the structure of the state of affairs that they stand for.
The activity also agrees with the finding that reasoning
with materials that are easy to visualize leads to activity
in the visual association cortex (Knauff, Fangmeier,
et al., 2003; Ruff et al., 2003; Knauff et al., 2002; Goel
et al., 2000). However, a novel finding in our study
is that these visual processes seem to be engaged
mostly during the first and second phases of the rea-
soning process. In addition, they were similarly elicited
by both the reasoning and the maintenance problems
(see Figure 3A and B). This demonstrates that the prem-
ises are at first processed in a similar fashion under
both conditions, and that the participants maintained
the premises in working memory by visual strategies,
not exclusively by verbal rehearsal (Smith & Jonides,
1998; Smith, Jonides, Marshuetz, & Koeppe, 1998) or
language-based representations postulated by the for-
mal rules theory (Braine & O’Brien, 1998; Rips, 1994).
Figure 2. Brain activation during reasoning and maintenance. Activated regions are shown separately for reasoning and maintenance during
the three phases. Reasoning problems: (A) premise processing phase, (B) integration phase, (C) validation phase. Maintenance problems:
(D) premise processing phase, (E) premise maintenance phase, (F) validation phase. The activations were significant at the cluster level
calculated with SPM99 ( p  .05, corrected, threshold t = 3.0). The bar charts with mean error bars below display the beta means for each
phase (±12 mm around the peak voxel within the cluster): first phase (P1), second phase (P2), and the validation phase for the conclusion
(C) or for maintenance (M). The position of the peak voxel is shown by the Talairach coordinates (TAL [X Y Z]) below each bar chart.
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However, the maintenance processing phase additional-
ly activated the left TC (medial and superior temporal
gyrus, BA 21, 22; see Figure 4D). This might indicate the
additional demand of the maintenance problem to
remember both premises and their presentation se-
quence as separate entities. During the reasoning prob-
lems the premises might be integrated into one single
representation, which might be less demanding to main-
tain (see below).
Integration Phase
The second stage of the reasoning problem comprised
the integration of the information from the first and
second premises. Behavioral data indicate that such in-
tegration of premise information occurs during process-
ing of the second premise (Maybery, Bain, & Halford,
1986). In this phase, the reasoners construct a single
integrated model of the state of affairs described in the
premises, so that the premises of the reasoning problem
are no longer represented as separate entities in work-
ing memory (Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982).
We found significantly higher activation in the APFC
(see Figures 2B and 4B) during the integration phase.
This activation is most likely to reflect a process specific
to reasoning, such as premise integration. This is con-
sistent with other studies that have found the APFC to
be involved in relational integration during reasoning,
or in considering multiple relations simultaneously
(Christoff et al., 2001; Prabhakaran, Rypma, & Gabrieli,
2001; Prabhakaran, Narayanan, Zhao, & Gabrieli, 2000;
Waltz et al., 1999). Further support for a role of the APFC
in premise integration comes from a study by Kroger
et al. (2002), who found that APFC activity corresponded
to the relational complexity of a problem, and not to
Table 2. Localization of Activation during
the Maintenance Problems
Anatomical Region BA t Score
Talairach
Coordinates
x y z
Premise Processing Phase
Cluster left occipito-temporal (VOX = 295***)
Fusiform gyrus (L) 37 11.43 40 59 14
Inferior occipital
gyrus (L)
19 10.92 44 70 7
Middle occipital
gyrus (L)
19 7.09 28 88 19
Cluster right occipito-temporal (VOX = 311***)
Fusiform gyrus (R) 19 12.96 40 74 10
Middle occipital
gyrus (R)
37 8.09 48 63 7
Fusiform gyrus (R) 37 7.34 36 59 11
Premise Maintenance Phase
Cluster left Insula (VOX = 161***)
Insula (L) 13 5.84 24 30 24
Cingulate gyrus (L) 24 5.70 12 10 34
Cingulate gyrus (L) 24 5.51 16 10 41
Cluster right temporal (VOX = 57**)
Fusiform gyrus (R) 20 6.64 44 5 23
Middle temporal
gyrus (R)
21 6.26 52 8 13
Middle temporal
gyrus (R)
21 5.07 52 3 27
Cluster left occipito-temporal (VOX = 285***)
Inferior occipital
gyrus (L)
19 9.50 44 70 7
Fusiform gyrus (L) 37 9.18 40 51 8
Fusiform gyrus (L) 37 8.05 36 48 18
Cluster right occipito-temporal (VOX = 228***)
Fusiform gyrus (R) 19 9.11 36 70 10
Cerebellum,
Culmen (R)
— 6.20 8 47 11
Parahippocampal
gyrus (R)
36 5.45 16 40 15
Maintenance Validation Phase
Cluster left parietal (VOX = 90***)
Supramarginal gyrus (L) 40 7.73 36 41 39
Inferior parietal
lobule (L)
40 6.94 40 44 46
Table 2. (continued )
Anatomical Region BA t Score
Talairach
Coordinates
x y z
Precuneus (L) 7 5.18 16 64 51
Cluster right parietal (VOX = 154**)
Precuneus (R) 7 7.67 8 76 41
Precuneus (R) 7 5.64 4 68 40
Precuneus (R) 19 4.97 28 72 37
RFX Analysis: SPM(t)s were thresholded for height at t = 3.0 and
cluster level p  .05, corrected for multiple comparisons. Locations,
t scores, and Talairach coordinates refer to the peak voxels of the
cluster. The correspondence of this voxel to Brodmann’s areas is only
established when applicable; however, note that localization can only
be performed at the level of the whole cluster. VOX = number of
voxels; L = left; R = right.
**p  .01.
***p  .001.
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general problem difficulty. Finally, a review of the func-
tion of an APFC structure (anterior part of BA 10)
suggests that this area is responsible for relational
integration, and the more general combination and
coordination of outputs from multiple cognitive oper-
ations (Ramnani & Owen, 2004). Note that such inte-
gration processes were not necessary during pure
maintenance problems, for which we found significant
lower APFC activation in the corresponding phase.
One might object that several alternative explanations
for these results can be derived from the working mem-
ory literature, which have linked activity in the APFC
during higher cognitive problems with working mem-
ory storage capacity (Rypma, Prabhakaran, Desmond,
Glover, & Gabrieli, 1999), verbal memory encoding
(Rypma & D’Esposito, 1999), the generation and evalu-
ation of hypotheses (Goel & Vartanian, 2005), or other
working memory subprocesses (Goel, Shuren, Sheesley,
& Grafman, 2004; Prabhakaran, Rypma, et al., 2001;
Deglin & Kinsbourne, 1996; Gabrieli, Singh, Stebbins,
& Goetz, 1996; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Salthouse,
Mitchell, Skovronek, & Babcock, 1989). Moreover, sev-
eral reviews and meta-analyses found a substantial over-
lap of prefrontal activity patterns across different
cognitive problems, possibly pointing to more generic
processes than premise integration (Wager & Smith,
2003; Duncan & Owen, 2000). However, such working-
memory-based explanations for the APFC activations
during the second phase of our reasoning problems
seem unlikely, as the memory load for both reasoning
and maintenance problems was identical. In addition,
Table 3. Localization of Activation between Reasoning
and Maintenance
Anatomical Region BA t Score
Talairach
Coordinates
x y z
Premise Processing Phase (Phase 1)
Reasoning minus
Maintenance
no additional activity measured
Maintenance minus Reasoning
TC L lateral (VOX = 14***)
Middle temporal
gyrus (L)
21 4.31 59 46 6
TC L medial (VOX = 17***)
Superior temporal
gyrus (L)
22 4.17 44 39 2
Middle temporal
gyrus (L)
21 3.63 48 47 2
Integration Phase (Phase 2)
Reasoning minus Maintenance
APFC R (VOX =10***)
Medial frontal
gyrus (R)
10 3.74 12 50 3
Basal ganglia (VOX = 18***)
Claustrum (R) — 4.18 24 27 1
Putamen (R) — 3.80 20 16 7
Caudate body (R) — 3.65 20 24 10
Maintenance minus
Reasoning
no additional activity measured
Maintenance/Reasoning Validation Phase (Phase 3)
Reasoning minus Maintenance
PFC L (VOX = 42***)
Superior frontal
gyrus (L)
8 4.60 20 18 43
Middle frontal
gyrus (L)
6 3.82 36 6 48
Middle frontal
gyrus (L)
6 3.58 40 14 44
PFC R (VOX = 76***)
Medial frontal
gyrus (R)
32 6.93 20 10 47
Middle frontal
gyrus (R)
8 6.27 24 18 40
Middle frontal
gyrus (R)
6 3.36 36 6 44
Table 3. (continued )
Anatomical Region BA t Score
Talairach
Coordinates
x y z
PPC R (VOX = 33***)
Precuneus (R) 7 4.81 12 59 58
Precuneus (R) 7 4.10 24 60 51
Maintenance minus Reasoning
OC M (VOX = 26***)
Cuneus (R) 18 4.83 12 77 22
Cuneus (M) 18 3.54 0 80 26
Cuneus (L) 18 3.33 12 76 26
SPM(t)s were thresholded for height at t = 3.0. Locations, t scores, and
Talairach coordinates refer to the peak voxels of the cluster. The
correspondence of this voxel to Brodmann’s areas is only established
when applicable. We calculated separate 2  3 factorial ANOVA
(repeated measurements) for all obtained regions (all interactions
were significant at p  .01, df = 2, 22) and a paired-samples t test
compared the relevant factor levels. VOX = number of voxels; L = left;
R = right; M = medial.
***p  .001, df = 11.
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we controlled the difficulty differences between the two
problems with two strategies: Only correctly solved
problems were used for our results, and partialing
out the discrepancies in difficulty for any given trial
(via parametric modulation of BOLD responses by trial
response time) did not change our results.
Validation Phase
In the final phase, in which a putative conclusion must
be verified, we found activations in the bilateral PPC
and the PFC, which were more marked for the rea-
soning than for the maintenance problems (Figure 4
bar charts). The PPC plays an important role in spatial
processing and working memory (Burgess, Maguire,
Spiers, & O’Keefe, 2001; Oliveri et al., 2001; Postle,
Berger, & D’Esposito, 1999; Smith et al., 1998; Baker,
Frith, Frackowiak, & Dolan, 1996) and in the integration
of sensory information from all modalities into egocen-
tric spatial representations (Xing & Andersen, 2000;
Bushara et al., 1999; Andersen, Snyder, Bradley, & Xing,
1997; Colby & Duhamel, 1996).
Our finding thus highlights the critical role of modality-
independent spatial representations specifically during
the validation of the premises. Note that this account
also resolves inconsistencies in previous neuroimaging
studies on reasoning. These studies have similarly im-
plied that the parietal cortex may play a key role in
reasoning based on mental models, which are sup-
posed to be of abstract spatial nature. However, these
studies have also shown concurrent activation of visual
association cortices (Goel & Dolan, 2001; Goel et al.,
2000), which points to the role of visual mental imagery
in reasoning (Knauff, Fangmeier, et al., 2003; Ruff et al.,
2003). The present study unifies these accounts, because
it shows for the first time that visual association areas are
indeed involved in premise processing and the construc-
tion of an initial static representation of the initial model,
but that more abstract spatial representations held in
parietal cortices are important for subsequent processes,
in particular, when the model must be verified. Our data
also underline that such reasoning-specific processes
in the parietal cortex might be lateralized to the right
hemisphere. Although bilateral parietal structures were
commonly activated by both the reasoning and the
maintenance problems (Figure 3C), consistent with the
proposed involvement of the parietal cortex in elemen-
tary working memory processes (Wager & Smith, 2003),
we found the right precuneus to be significantly more
active during reasoning validation than during the
corresponding phase of the maintenance problems
(Figure 4C). The additional activation of prefrontal
structures during this phase (BA 8, 6, and dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex) indicates that further executive pro-
cesses may be necessary for the control of this validation
phase (Fletcher & Henson, 2001; Smith & Jonides,
1999). The main activity in the PFC lies in the middle
frontal gyrus (BA 6, 8), bilaterally and covers parts of the
Figure 3. Common brain
activation. Common activated
regions for both problems
were shown in the glass
brain. (A) Reasoning and
maintenance first phase; (B)
Reasoning and maintenance
second phase; and (C)
Reasoning and maintenance
third phase. All activations
were significant at the cluster
level calculated with SPM99
( p  .05, corrected, threshold
t = 3.0).
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caudal superior frontal sulcus. Anatomical data show
that the posterior dorsolateral PFC BA 8 and rostral
BA 6 have bidirectional connections with the PPC, for
example, BA 7 and the more rostral-lying DLPFC
(Petrides & Pandya, 1999). We assume that this activa-
tion has to do with the variation of the model to check
putative conclusions (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) that
was not necessary for maintenance problems. This as-
sumption is also supported by the findings from Ruff
et al. (2003). In this study, we used indeterminate
problems (i.e., problems in which multiple solutions
must be considered). Such problems require extensive
model variation and we found increased activation in
the rostral DLPFC, corresponding to BA 9. However, the
study by Ruff et al. differs in many other respects from
the present study and the block design only showed an
activation mix of all reasoning stages. Further studies
are needed to explore the role of specific areas in the
DLPFC if reasoners solve problems that require exten-
sive model variation.
Individual Differences
In a previous study, we found a negative correlation
between reasoning-related activity in the right parietal
cortex and individual spatial ability (Ruff, Knauff, &
Fangmeier, 2004; Ruff et al., 2003). We explained that
finding by a resource-model, in which the reasoning
problems seemed to have placed less demand on visuo-
spatial processing resources of participants with high
skill levels, so that less activity in the relevant cortical
regions was required (Ruff et al., 2003, see also Keller,
Carpenter, & Just, 2001; Just, Carpenter, Keller, Eddy, &
Thulborn, 1996). Here, we replicated this finding, but
can extend the explanation with respect to the specific
stage of the reasoning process that showed this rela-
Figure 4. Brain activation between conditions. The figure shows all differences in activation between reasoning and maintenance. Reasoning
versus maintenance: (A) first phase, (B) second phase, and (C) third phase. Conversely, contrasts for the first, second, and third phases are
displayed at (D), (E), and (F), respectively. The first phase corresponds to the premise processing phase, the second phase to the reasoning
integration and premise maintenance phase, and the third phase to the reasoning or maintenance validation phase. All highest peak voxels of a
cluster were significant at the voxel level calculated with SPM99 (threshold t = 3.0). ROI analysis: The bar charts with mean error bars below display
the beta means for each phase: first premise (P1), second premise (P2), and the validation for the conclusion (C) or for maintenance (M).
Significant differences (paired t test, p  .05) between the problems within a phase are labeled with asterisks. The position of the peak voxel is
shown by the Talairach coordinates (TAL [X Y Z]) below each bar chart.
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tionship. Although a few other correlations between the
BDT and the BOLD signal were found, the most impor-
tant result is the negative correlation in the PPC. This
correlation was also found in our previous studies, but
here we show that this negative correlation of BOLD
signal in the parietal cortex and visuospatial skill level
only appears during the integration phase. Participants
with higher spatial ability showed less activation in the
right PPC (BA 7), as well as in left BA 7 (Table 4) only in this
phase of the inference. Our results thus again support the
notion that individual differences in parietal activity during
model construction might reflect individual limits in
neurocognitive processing resources (Reichle, Carpenter,
& Just, 2000), which appear most heavily taxed during
the integration phase of the inference process.
Conclusions
In sum, our study on the neurocognitive processes
underlying reasoning supports the notion that reasoning
can be described as a three-stage process, reflecting
premise processing, premise integration, and conclu-
sion validation. In this article, we identified neural
Table 4. Correlation between Individual Skill Differences and
BOLD Signal during the Problems
Talairach
Coordinates
Anatomical Region BA t Score x y z
Reasoning
Premise Processing Phase
No significant cluster
Premise Integration Phase
PPC L (NC, VOX = 115***)
Precuneus 7 5.79 20 60 47
Cingulate gyrus 31 5.28 20 53 32
Precuneus 7 4.19 24 76 41
PPC R (NC, VOX = 106***)
Cingulate gyrus 31 5.22 20 46 21
Superior parietal lobule 7 5.07 28 64 40
Basal ganglia — 5.07 28 34 13
FC R (NC, VOX = 85***)
Medial frontal gyrus 6 5.36 4 24 57
Precentral gyrus 4 5.26 16 20 56
Precentral gyrus 4 4.78 32 17 52
Validation Phase
Basal ganglia/Thalamus L (NC, VOX =48*)
Basal ganglia — 4.56 16 1 15
Thalamus — 4.52 16 23 16
Thalamus — 4.43 8 3 11
Cingulate gyrus M (PC, VOX = 80**)
Cingulate gyrus (L) 23 6.65 8 14 30
Cingulate gyrus (R) — 6.49 16 30 31
Cingulate gyrus (L) 24 5.88 12 3 30
Maintenance
Premise Processing Phase
PFC R (NC, VOX = 74**)
Middle frontal gyrus 8 6.34 28 17 36
Superior frontal gyrus 9 4.60 16 48 23
Cingulate gyrus 32 4.35 20 25 32
Basal ganglia L (NC, VOX = 73**)
Basal ganglia — 5.35 24 14 27
Basal ganglia — 4.83 24 34 20
Basal ganglia — 3.74 24 7 15
Table 4. (continued )
Anatomical Region BA t Score
Talairach
Coordinates
x y z
APFC R (NC, VOX = 51*)
Superior frontal gyrus 10 8.32 24 44 24
Superior frontal gyrus 9 5.15 12 52 20
Middle frontal gyrus 9 3.87 28 29 28
Premise Maintenance Phase
No significant cluster
Validation Phase
Corpus callosum/basal ganglia (PC, VOX = 183***)
Corpus callosum — 7.29 4 16 14
Basal ganglia — 5.74 24 1 15
Inferior frontal gyrus 46 5.18 32 31 6
Simple Regression Analysis: SPM(t)s were thresholded for height at t =
3.0, and cluster level p  .05, corrected for multiple comparisons.
Locations, t scores, and Talairach coordinates refer to the peak voxels
of the cluster. The correspondence of this voxel to Brodmann’s areas is
only established when applicable; however, note that localization can
only be performed at the level of the whole cluster (the correlation
of the PPC is shown in Figure 5). VOX = number of voxels; L = left;
R = right; M = medial; NC = negative correlation; PC = positive
correlation.
*p  .05.
**p  .01.
***p  .001.
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structures that are specifically involved in the cognitive
processes taking place in each phase. The activation in
the OTC during premise processing replicates earlier
results (Knauff et al., 2003; Ruff et al., 2003), which
showed that problems that are easily visualized elicit
activity in brain regions devoted to visuospatial pro-
cessing. Premise integration and validation resulted in
activation of anterior prefrontal, as well as the prefron-
tal and right posterior parietal cortices, respectively.
We suppose that the activation in the APFC (BA 10) de-
pends on executive demand which is necessary for the
integration process (Ramnani & Owen, 2004). During
the validation phase, more abstract multimodal areas
in the PPC were activated for both problem types,
but with activation in the right precuneus specific to
reasoning. This underlines that the PPC and the PFC
may be responsible and necessary for the validation of
the mental models.
Our three-stage model of the neural correlates of
reasoning is inspired by a strictly cognitive framework
of human reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 2001). This so-
called mental models theory relies on behavioral data
only, but also assumes that reasoners construct visuo-
spatial mental models, derive a putative conclusion
from them, and try to validate this conclusion by search-
ing for counterexamples contradicting this conclusion
( Johnson-Laird, 2001). Our present study provides neu-
rophysiological support for three such distinct phases of
reasoning, at least for deductive reasoning with spatial
relations. Recently, Goodwin and Johnson-Laird (2005)
have extended the theory of reasoning about relations
to incorporate additional principles. One principle is
called iconicity, which states that the structure of a
model is iconic as far as possible. The OTC activation
found here during the initial phase of the reasoning
process is consistent with this additional principle.
Because the theory of mental models claims to be a
universal theory of human reasoning, these three phases
may underlie all other sorts of reasoning as well, for
example, syllogistic reasoning with quantifiers such as
‘‘all,’’ ‘‘some,’’ ‘‘none,’’ or conditional reasoning with
‘‘if’’ and ‘‘than.’’ A word of caution, however, is that the
cognitive and neural processes in reasoning might de-
pend on the nature of the problem. Reasoning with
visually presented spatial relations might elicit mental
models, but reasoning with other problems might evoke
other processes.
METHODS
Participants
Twelve right-handed male undergraduate and graduate
students (mean age 22.4, SD 1.98) with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision (contact lenses) gave their
informed consent prior to their participation in the
study. None of the volunteers had any history of neuro-
logical or psychiatric disorders, or of significant drug
abuse. All procedures complied with both university and
hospital ethical approval.
Materials
The materials consisted of 32 reasoning and 32 mainte-
nance problems. The reasoning problems contained two
premises and a conclusion. The participants had to
decide whether the conclusion necessarily followed
from the premises (see Figure 1). Here is an example
of a reasoning problem with a valid conclusion:
The letter of the premises and conclusions appeared
sequentially on the screen. A sentential version of the
given example would be: ‘‘V is to the left of X’’ (first
premise) and ‘‘X is to the left of Z’’ (second premise).
From these premises, it follows ‘‘V is to the left of Z’’
(conclusion). Participants used an MRI-compatible re-
Figure 5. Negative correlation between the BOLD signal and the
Block Design Test. The figure shows the negative correlation betwen
individual skill differences (BDT) and the BOLD signal during the
premise integration phase while the participants performed the
reasoning problems. Premise integration phase: Cluster for the left and
right PPC (precuneus, BA 7). The activations were significant at
the cluster level calculated with SPM99 ( p  .05, corrected, threshold
t = 3.0). T score is indexed by the color bar.
Premise 1: V X
Premise 2: X Z
Conclusion: V Z
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sponse box to indicate whether a conclusion was ‘‘True’’
or ‘‘False.’’ Only the letters V, X, and Z were used,
because they have almost the same black–white ratio
and no problem-related words (in German) can be built
from them. In the maintenance problems, the presen-
tation of the two premises was the same as in the
reasoning problem, but the participants had to decide
whether the third sentence was identical to one of the
previous premises or not. Thus, no inference between
the two premises had to be made. Here is an example of
a maintenance problem:
In this case, participants had to press the ‘‘TRUE’’ key,
because the third sentence is an exact repetition of the
first premise. Prior to each problem, an ‘‘S’’ or an ‘‘E’’
was presented for 1 sec to identify the next trial as
reasoning problem (‘‘Schließen’’ in German) or main-
tenance problem (‘‘Erinnern’’ in German), respectively.
The spatial relation between the two letters of each
premise or conclusion was coded by placing it right or
left from the midpoint of the screen. Each trial began
with presentation of the first letter for 1500 msec,
followed by the second letter for 1500 msec, and a
pause for 1000 msec (first premise), making a total of
4 sec. The time period for the second premise and the
conclusion or maintenance was the same as during the
first premise. Each trial lasted for about 14 sec. In half
of the premises and conclusions, the letter on the left
side appeared first, followed by the letter on the right,
whereas the other half were presented in the reverse
order. This variation of term order is well established
in reasoning research (Knauff, Rauh, Schlieder, & Strube,
1998) and prevented participants from anticipating the
next letter and from drawing the conclusion during the
second premise.
Behavioral Data Acquisition
Participants responded with index and middle fingers
on a response box in order to record the reaction
time and accuracy of each problem. Prior to the im-
aging study, participants were trained on 12 similar
problems outside the scanner to at least 75% response
accuracy.
Post-test
To examine the influence of individual differences in
skill, the participants were tested after the experiment
with the ‘‘BDT’’ from the German equivalent to the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Tewes, 1991).
Procedure and fMRI Data Acquisition
Problems were presented in an event-related design
with four separate runs. Each run contained eight
reasoning and eight recognition problems in a pseudo-
randomized order. All problems were presented for an
equal amount of time, and each premise or conclusion
lasted for 4000 msec. Scanning was performed on a 1.5-T
Siemens Vision scanner and the participant’s head was
fixed in the head coil. A mirror was placed on the coil so
that participants could see a projection screen mounted
on the rear of the scanner bore. All visual stimuli were
projected onto this screen using a video projector. Scan-
ner noise was reduced by headphones. Functional im-
ages were collected with a gradient-recalled echo-planar
imaging (EPI) sequence, allowing the sampling of 30 par-
allel slices covering the whole brain [TR (repetition
time): 4000 msec; TA (acquisition time): 3126 msec; TE
(echo time): 60 msec; FOV (field of view): 256 mm 
256 mm in-plane resolution; 4 mm3 isotropic voxel size].
Eighty-five functional image volumes were collected in
each of the four stimulus runs lasting 340 sec. The first
two scans of each run were excluded in order for T1-
effects to stabilize. A functional EPI image with 40 slices
(FOV: 256 mm  256 mm, 2 mm  2 mm) and a sagit-
tal T1-weighted magnetization prepared, rapid acquisi-
tion gradient-echo (MP-RAGE) image of the entire brain
[160 slices, TR: 40 msec; TE: 6 msec; FA (flip angle): 408;
FOV: 256 mm  256 mm; 1 mm3 isotropic voxel size]
were acquired for purpose of coregistration and nor-
malization during image preprocessing. The presenta-
tion of each stimulus (premises and conclusion) was
synchronized with the TTL-pulse emitted by the scanner,
and stimuli were presented with the software package
‘‘Presentation’’ (Presentation1, 2003).
fMRI Preprocessing
Functional and anatomical images were reoriented so
that the anterior commissure corresponded to the
origin of the three-dimensional standard coordinate
system used in the software Statistical Parametric Map-
ping 99 (SPM99, 1999). The four runs for each subject
were separately realigned and corrected for motion, and
underwent slice timing correction. Each subject’s ana-
tomical image was coregistered with a 40-slice EPI and
the functional images of each run. The parameters for
spatial normalization were determined from the ana-
tomical images of each subject, and were applied to the
corresponding functional images. Images were finally
smoothed with an 8-mm full-width half-maximum
Gaussian kernel.
fMRI Statistical Analyses
The hemodynamic response to the premises and con-
clusions was modeled with event-related delta functions,
Premise 1: V X
Premise 2: X Z
Maintenance: V X
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which were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic
response function and its temporal derivative em-
ployed in SPM99. Low-frequency confounds were ex-
cluded from the model with a high-pass filter (192 sec
cutoff ), and an autoregression AR(1) model excluded
the variance explained by the previous scan. The six re-
alignment parameters for each run were included as
covariates to avoid motion artifacts. If the correlation of
two parameters was higher than 0.8, one of the param-
eters was excluded to obtain colinearity. First-level con-
trast images for every subject and contrast were then
used for a random effects analysis to draw inferences on
brain activation during the experimental problems. Only
correctly answered problems were included in the anal-
ysis. All reported clusters within the conditions and the
conjunction analysis are significant at the cluster level
p  .05, corrected for multiple comparisons (threshold
t = 3.0).The contrasts within each condition were cal-
culated for reasoning (R): premise processing phase
(Premise 2 minus Premise 1), integration phase (Prem-
ise 2 minus Conclusion), validation phase (Conclusion
minus Premise 2) and maintenance (M): premise pro-
cessing phase (Premise 2 minus Premise 1), maintenance
phase (Premise 2 minus Premise 3), validation phase
(Premise 3 minus Premise 2). Contrasts for the con-
junction analysis were calculated with ImCalc (package
within SPM99 which performs user-specific algebraic
manipulations) in which the t value for each single con-
trast was compared. The following conjunction analyses
were made: [(R Premise 2 minus Premise 1) and (M Prem-
ise 2 minus Premise 1)], [(R Premise 2 minus Premise 3)
and (M Premise 2 minus Premise 3)], [(R Premise 3 minus
Premise 2) and (M Premise 3 minus Premise 2)]. Con-
trasts between the conditions were R Premise 1 minus
M Premise 1, R Premise 2 minus M Premise 2, and R Con-
clusion minus M Premise 3 and conversely. These con-
trasts were also thresholded with t = 3.0.
Although we calculated our model only with correctly
answered problems, we used an additional analysis in
order to control the difficulty discrepancy between the
two problems. The second model was calculated with
the reaction times as a supplementary linear parametric
regressor. The contrasts were the same as before.
fMRI Region-of-Interests Analyses
The empirically derived regression parameters were
extracted for each subject, problem, and phase (prem-
ises, conclusion, and maintenance) in the eight clusters
that were found in the analysis between the conditions
(see Figure 4). The data from each ROI were calculated
in a separate 2  3 factorial ANOVA (Problem  Phase,
repeated measurements). If we found significant differ-
ences in the ANOVA, we compared the relevant factor
levels with paired-samples t tests. Significant differences
between the problems within a phase are labeled with
asterisks (Figure 4 bar charts and Table 3).
fMRI Correlation with the ‘‘Block Design Test’’
An additional analysis was done in SPM99 to examine the
association between individual skill differences and acti-
vations while the participants performed the reasoning
problems. The participants were tested after the exper-
iment with the ‘‘BDT’’ of the German equivalent to the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (HAWIE-R) (Tewes,
1991), which correlates with spatial ability. Activity for
each reasoning phase was correlated with the outcome
of the BDT for each participant in a simple regression
RFX model.
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